Explain and
discuss behaviourism and functionalism and teleo-functionalism. Analyse the
arguments which were used to support them. Are any satisfactory accounts of (a)
experiences (b) propositional attitudes?
Greg Detre
Wednesday, 25 October, 2000
Philosophy of Mind, II
The identity theory describes brain processes and mental processes as one. A token identity theory holds that we can identify any given brain process with a particular mental state, while a type theory claims that we can aggregate types of mental and physical processes together. Whatever form the identity theory takes, it is a monist theory, with materialism (or physicalism) as its preferred substrate. Behaviourism and functionalism flesh out frameworks for understanding the mental in materialist terms (though certain forms of functionalism cannot be characterised so simply).
In its simplest form, behaviourism sees us as little more than advanced stimulus-response machines, extremely complex but ultimately fathomable automata. We have a very rich sensory apparatus and a huge, intricate and varied range of motor responses, so there is obviously rather more to us than a finite state machine (a list of predetermined responses to every situation). In relating this input to output, behaviourism considers the mental as simply �dispositions to behaviour�, dismissing talk of the non-physical mind or soul. The mental is relegated from a contingent-seeming, phenomenological, psychic mechanism to being wholly constituted by the physical and observable effects of the body. For instance, �I am hungry� described in behaviourist terms loses its qualitative flavour of a gaping, gnawing sensation in our belly, and becomes the rule or �disposition�, �If given the opportunity to eat, I will�. Ingenious attempts have been made to wholly translate the intentions, beliefs and desires of folk psychology into this mode of thinking, usually motivated by evidentialist philosophical or scientific aims. This strong form of behaviourism (sometimes known as �eliminative� or �psychological� behaviourism) has few adherents now, so it seems sensible to target instead the more powerful paradigms of neobehaviourism that grew up out of it.
At this point, the terminology becomes complicated as we are faced with disentangling a plethora of contemporary behaviourist formulations, so we will adopt Galen Strawson�s summary of neobehaviourism as �the view that mental life is linked to behaviour in such a way that reference to behaviour enters essentially and centrally into any adequate account of the nature of almost all, if not all, mental states and occurrences.�
This can be re-expressed in terms of two premises:
Strawson works hard to attack neobehaviourism through this first premise with his long example of the Weather Watchers, beings with rich mental lives that exhibit no behaviour. They just sit immobile on their home planet, observing the weather and landscape minutely, mutely hoping for certain changes but with absolutely no means to effect those changes, or exhibit any behaviour whatsoever[1].
He works hard to avoid falling prey to the criticism that our ability (or inability) to conceive or imagine a behaviourally inert mental being (a physical being which has mental properties) makes it impossible to believe that such a being could exist. He develops a number of plausible scenarios to account for the Weather Watchers� odd physiology, then systematically tackles the various points that a doubter might raise, such as how such beings could ever come to be alive (which he explains with the Rooting Story, as well as clearing any conceptual debris left over from suspect theories of logical naturalism), whether they�d have language-like thought without being able to talk, and critically, whether it is possible to have desires and beliefs without exhibiting behaviour. For instance, one can desire that Ivanov wins the World Chess Championship without wanting to act in any way to bring this about.
Thus, he contests both of Armstrong�s premises:
1. a causalist theory of the mental, i.e. that the defining characteristic of the mental is that it is �apt to be the cause of certain effects and the effect of certain causes�
2. that all mental events are evidenced/exist only in terms of, the behaviour they give rise to
He attacks the first by pointing to behaviourism�s inability to incorporate qualia into its framework. The inactive, behaviourless, desiring and belief-holding Weather Watchers are intended to make his point about the second. He is convincing as to the conceivability of the Weather Watchers, but the imagination still shuns the possibility of mind with senses but without motor control. In this sense, they are disembodied, and could perhaps serve to illustrate a functionalist argument too.
Functionalism characterises a mental state in terms of its causal and relational properties to other mental states as well as behaviour. The functional states of a mental being are determined by its functional organisation, i.e. the way in which it processes information, or to put it another way, how its functional components interact. Thus, mental states are defined in terms of their functional role. This is what Block terms �metaphysical functionalism�.
Importantly, functional organisation is independent of its physical instantiation. This has given rise to numerous examples of a mind instantiated in different forms retaining the same functional organisation, e.g. the silicon chip replacement thought experiment. When taken to extremes, one can imagine the entire population of China interacting to mimic the functional organisation of our neural activity, though obviously on a far slower time-scale.
At this point, functionalism is exposed to the same critique that any materialist-based theory flounders under. Would such a nation-wide mind be conscious, in the subjective, qualitative sense? In this particular and unusual case, the individual processing units are themselves conscious individuals, but we are assuming that their interaction with each other is in some restricted form, perhaps binary messages. The �absence of qualia�[2] objection runs that unless such a mind was somehow subject to phenomenological sensations, as we are, then it would be a processing unit but it would not be mental. One enormous benefit of these functionalist thought experiments is that some of them may well be performable in the distant future. However, this will leave us with the �problem of other minds�, that of determining whether such an organisation is conscious, when all we can really do is ask it. If it appears conscious, then we will simply have to conclude that it either is conscious, or that zombies are possible.
Functionalism can be expanded to include qualia to a greater or lesser degree of satisfaction. The escape also open to materialists is to say, �Yes, qualia are real, but they�re a mystery. I don�t know how they arise, but I don�t think they play a causal role in our system, and they could perhaps be explained as arising contingently out of some property of matter we don�t understand�. In this way, the qualia could be seen, almost like with a token identity theory, to arise out of some property of the physical instantiation. In this case, our functional states and our subjective states may seem unrelated in much the same way that Davidson describes a confusion in the translation of neural and linguistic descriptions. In this case, qualia may well vary from person to person, and certainly between humans, aliens and robots, despite their functional states, and thus behaviour, being the same.
[1] At this point it is worth clarifying his position on
his deliberately non-standard use of the term behaviour. Using Byrne�s
terminology, �behaviour� could be seen in terms of �physical� and �agential�
behaviour. Physical behaviour broadly includes any change in an agent�s body
while agential behaviour is restricted to behaviour controlled by the agent�s
volition. There can also be physical and agential behavioural dispositions. It
still remains to clarify how inclusive these definitions should be. As well as
willed observable activity, Strawson allows �behaviour� to include mental
behaviour, e.g. mental arithmetic. The only evidence of performing mental
arithmetic is in neural activity, which I don�t think he�s classing under
�behaviour�.
[2] The �inverted spectrum� example makes the point about qualia slightly differently. It imagines two beings with identical functional organisation in the same functional state, for example, the sensation of seeing �redness�. This would be the state that they would find themselves in whenever faced with a post-box or London bus. Yet, it could be that one person is faced with the subjective quality that the other would term �green�. The entire spectrum could be reversed for these functional isomorphs, and neither would be any the wiser. That a functionalist account is compatible with such a contradiction renders it invalid to those for whom qualia are very real, defining characteristics of the mental.